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1. RESEARCH GOALS
In essence, our article aims to highlight the role of the preliminary assumptions 
and basic tenets of western constitutionalism (e.g. the free mandate for parliamentar-
ians) in shaping the contents of constitutions and defining the scope of (in)admissible 
change.
Our case study is Italy. Italy can be traced back to “post-totalitarian constitu-
tionalism”, as its constitutional framework mirrors what philosophers have called “the 
memory of evil”,1 by excluding some principles from constitutional amendment. The 
topic has regained attention in the light of the rise of new forms of populism, especially 
1 TODOROV, Tzvetan. Memory as a Remedy for Evil. Kolkata: Seagull Books, 2010.
Abstract
This article addresses the subject of the free mandate for 
parliamentarians in Italy in relation to eternity clauses or 
inadmissible changes of the constitution, considering It-
aly’s constitution prevents amendments regarding some 
of its principles. This sort of counter-majoritarian devices 
protect constitutions from major changes and it gains 
importance due to the rise of new forms of populism. 
The article examines the relation between the elector-
al system and the free mandate for parliamentarians in 
Italy, recently changed by populist forces. Therefore the 
research outlines the context of Italian constitutional-
ism, and then addresses the role of parliaments and the 
“procedures” in this scenario, reaching the subject of the 
role of electoral legislation on the constitutional order, 
especially regarding the involvement of constitutional 
courts in electoral law. Finally, it discusses the free man-
date for MPs, showing how complex constitutional prin-
ciples are at stake, such as equality and representation. It 
concludes that electoral law should be interpreted and 
reviewed in the light of all the relevant constitutional 
principles and also should be protected from populist 
moves. The article uses a logical-deductive methodology 
with legislative and theoretical analysis of the subject.
Keywords: free mandate; eternity clauses; populism; 
constitucional change; electoral law.
Resumo
Este artigo aborda o tema do mandato livre para parlamen-
tares na Itália em relação às cláusulas pétreas ou mudanças 
inadmissíveis da constituição, considerando que a Consti-
tuição italiana impede alterações em alguns de seus prin-
cípios. Esse tipo de dispositivo contramajoritário protege as 
constituições de grandes mudanças e ganha importância 
devido ao surgimento de novas formas de populismo. O 
artigo examina a relação entre o sistema eleitoral e a liber-
dade para o exercício do mandato dos parlamentares na 
Itália, recentemente modificada por forças populistas. As-
sim, a pesquisa delineia o contexto do constitucionalismo 
italiano e, em seguida, aborda o papel dos parlamentos e 
os “procedimentos” nesse cenário, chegando ao tema do 
papel da legislação eleitoral na ordem constitucional, es-
pecialmente no que diz respeito ao envolvimento dos tri-
bunais constitucionais no direito eleitoral. Por fim, discute 
a liberdade para o exercício do mandato dos deputados, 
mostrando como estão em jogo princípios constitucionais 
complexos, como igualdade e representação. Conclui que o 
Direito eleitoral deve ser interpretado e revisto à luz de todos 
os princípios constitucionais relevantes e também deve ser 
protegido de movimentos populistas. O artigo utiliza uma 
metodologia lógico-dedutiva com análise legislativa e teó-
rica da matéria.
Palavras-chave: mandato livre; cláusulas pétreas; 
populismo; mudança constitucional; Direito eleitoral.
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in Europe. Constitutional amendment2 offers a privileged perspective for exploring the 
impact of populism on constitutional democracy, as it inevitably leads to the idea of 
constitutional rigidity as one of the most important counter-majoritarian devices of 
post-World War II constitutionalism. Against this background, we focus on the existence 
in Italy of supreme principles of (democratic) organization, recognizing that in each po-
litical regime there are inevitable organizational and procedural “surviving conditions”.
These conditions are necessary for the preservation of the untouchable consti-
tutional core guaranteed by eternity clauses. Limits to constitutional amendment are 
generally linked to fundamental structural choices, like the republican form of a state, 
and safeguardsof fundamental rights. What can be said, however, about provisions reg-
ulating the institutional architecture? Among these, we examine the continuum be-
tween the electoral system and the free mandate for parliamentarians, which has been 
recently challenged, in particular, by populist forces such as the Five Star Movement.
Elections and voting systems are extensively discussed during constitution-mak-
ing processes. This should come as no surprise, as electoral rules are underpinned by 
basic assumptions and understandings regarding the functioning of representative de-
mocracy. In this respect, the Italian Republic is no exception. No specific voting system 
(say, proportional representation) is entrenched in the Italian Constitution or in the Ger-
man Basic Law. However, silence and an absence of specific provisions are hardly the 
signals of constitutional agnosticism in this area. There are a number of tacit assump-
tions, resulting, for example, from agreements between the actors involved in the draft-
ing of the constitution, that can be seen as somehow entrenched even thoughthey are 
“unwritten”, and they are essential to the functioning of the constitution itself, as is clear 
from the analysis of recent decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court. More and more 
often, however, the selection of representatives has been linked in the public debate to 
another “core value” of representative democracy, the free mandate for MPs. As the Ven-
ice Commission stated, “imperative mandate is generally awkward to Western democ-
racies. The constitutions of many countries explicitly prohibit imperative mandate”.3 At 
the same time, scholars have argued that “populists’ claim to the imperative mandate 
can be understood as a […] sign of the dissatisfaction of a huge part of the popula-
tion with a kind of democracy in which those in power are increasingly distant from 
the governed”,4 which is – again – at the very core of the perception of a functioning 
2  See comprehensive analysis by ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and 
Changing Constitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
3  Report on the imperative mandate and similar practices adopted by the council for democratic elections 
at its 28th meeting (Venice, 14 March 2009) and by the Venice Commission at its 79th plenary session (Venice, 
12-13 June 2009).
4  TOMBA, Massimiliano. Who’s Afraid of the Imperative Mandate?Critical Times, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 108-119, Jan/
Dec 2018.p. 108.
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democracy. The debate on how representatives are chosen and what can (or cannot) 
be done to ensure their compliance with their mandate is crucial in any reflection on 
constitutional change.
2. SETTING THE SCENE
“Constitutions belong to all but are not ‘empty’ (politically neutral)”.5 With these 
words, an eminent constitutional lawyer reacted to a series of attacks launched on the 
Italian constitution by certain political parties at the beginning of the new millennium. 
Indeed, the irony in this is that the new wave of populism has been obliging constitu-
tional lawyers to deal with some long-standing issues, including that of the neutrality 
of the constitution. 
One of these long-standing issues is the relationship between constitutionalism 
and democracy, and the limits posed to constitutional change by the need to preserve 
some fundamental goods that may or may not be codified in an explicit constitutional 
provision. The unamendability of some provisions of the Italian Constitution is related 
to its lack of neutrality, and to the rejection of the totalitarian past that is codified in Ar-
ticle 139, the so-called “Republican form”. This article reads: “The form of Republic shall 
not be a matter for constitutional amendment”. Scholars have placed this clause within 
the context of a broader trend of comparative law. However, if it is true that Article 139 
is not the only example of an unamendable clause in comparative law, it set the trend 
for the much more famous eternity clause included in the German Basic Law. 
In the twentieth century, explicit unamendability has become a popular constitution-
al design: in the post-war constitutional wave, almost one third of the newly adopted 
constitutions included one or more unamendable clauses. In the post-cold war consti-
tutional wave, this figure staggered to 50 per cent approximately. However, even if the 
unamendable clause of the 1948 Italian Constitution does not represent a significant 
novelty in the comparative scenario, its historical premises are worthy of attention. In 
fact, its inclusion in the last article of the constitution is due to a peculiar limitation of the 
primary constituent power of the Constituent Assembly, whose election was contextual 
to the referendum on the form of the state. Since the Constituent Assembly had no power 
to review the decision of the people on the form of state, it decided to eternally bind the 
constitutional amendment powers on this point.6
5  SPADARO, Antonino. Costituzionalismo versus populismo: sulla c.d. deriva populistico-plebiscitaria delle 
democrazie. In: BRUNELLI, Giuditta; PUGIOTTO, Andrea; VERONESI, Paolo (Coord.). Scritti in onore di Lorenza 
Carlassare, vol. V. Napoli: Jovene, 2009. p. 2007-2042.
6  FARAGUNA, Pietro. Unamendability and Constitutional Identity in the Italian Constitutional Experience. 
European Journal of Law Reform, vol. 21, n. 3,p. 329-344, Jul/Sep 2019. p. 333.
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The Italian constitution belongs to the group of constitutions that Mortati called 
“constitutions born from the Resistance”,7 as they were forged with the clear intention 
to deny and overcome all of the “values” (or anti-values) that had characterized the to-
talitarian era.
In the reference to“constitutions born from the Resistance”, Mortati included 
other constitutions, such as the French (Fourth Republic) and West German ones. As 
Carrozza8 noted, today we could include within this group the Portuguese, Spanish and 
Greek constitutions that were drafted during the 1970s.
It is possible to find this element in many constitutions born from the Resistance, 
as these were the product of political compromises between very different democratic 
forces. These forces had, as their only common point, the rejection of the totalitarian ex-
perience. This explains why these constitutions are inspired by the sincere denial of the 
features of the previous regime and by the need for an entirely different society. Some 
of these constitutions (including the Italian one) claimed that there was a need for new 
societal models, and were very rich in declarations of principle, reflecting a wish to pro-
duce a break with the past. In some cases, these so-called ‘promised revolutions9 have 
remained solely on paper, as was bitterly acknowledged by one of the most influential 
members of the Italian Constituent Assembly, Piero Calamandrei, with regard to many 
provisions of the Italian Constitution, a few years after it came into force.10
This programmatic character implied the need for a real turning point, not only 
in the ways of conceiving the values and premises of social life within the national bou-
ndaries. Frequently, the founding fathers of these constitutions born from the Resistan-
ce were induced to gamble on the codification of the values that should inspire the life 
and contribution of their nation in the international arena and community (external 
openness).
According to Carrozza, there are at least three central points in the evolution 
of Western constitutionalism: the distinction between constituent power and consti-
tuted power, the affirmation of the idea of the constitution as “higher law” and the 
7  MORTATI, Costantino. Lezioni sulle forme di governo. Padova: Cedam, 1973. p. 222 ff.
8 CARROZZA, Paolo. Constitutionalism’s Post-modern Opening. In: LOUGHLIN, Martin; WALKER, Neil (Coord.). 
The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. p. 169-187, p. 180.
9 Calamandrei wrote about a “promised revolution” in exchange for the failed revolution that had been 
sought by the Leftist forces, i.e. a rupture with the past that had to be even more radical than was envisaged 
at that time. CALAMANDREI, Piero. Cenni introduttivi sulla Costituente e i suoi lavori. In: CALAMANDREI, Piero; 
LEVI, Alessandro (Coord.). Commentario sistematico alla Costituzione italiana. Firenze: G. Barbera, 1950. 
Now in: CALAMANDREI, Piero. Opere giuridiche, vol. III, Diritto e processo costituzionale. Napoli: Morano, 
1965.p. 511-595.
10  CALAMANDREI, Piero. La Costituzione e le leggi per attuarla. In: AA.VV. Dieci anni dopo: 1945-1955. Roma: 
Laterza, 1955. Now in: CALAMANDREI, Piero. Opere giuridiche, vol. III, Diritto e processo costituzionale. Na-
poli: Morano, 1965, p. 511-595. p. 553 ff.
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combination of this idea with the discovery of the judicial review of legislation and, 
finally, the tension between universal aspiration (inherited from the rationalism of 
the Enlightenment) and national–territorial identity. In the light of these three central 
points, what Carrozza called “openness in post-modern constitutionalism” “may be in-
tended, according to Spadaro, as precisely the re-awakening and re-sensitization of the 
legal/political system to a superior human aspiration to justice, one that challenges the 
closure of a positivist legal/political system in which justice is reduced to formal legality. 
Not relativism, but reasonableness and proportionality, is the leitmotif of post-modern 
constitutionalism”.11
Both constitutional openness and the unamendability clause can be seen as 
the direct offspring of the rejection of the legal nationalism that had characterized the 
totalitarian phase in Italy. They are both functional to the preservation of some high-
er goods that cannot be affected by the choices of the contingent majority in office. 
As such, these higher goods are beyond the political process and are untouchable. 
As Faraguna pointed out: “The formulation of the unamendability clause of the Ital-
ian Constitution israther short and vague when compared with the formulation of un-
amendability clauses of the same generation. In fact, unamendable provisions grew 
not only numerically but also in length and complexity, increasingly covering more and 
more protected values”.12
In Judgment 1146/1988, the Italian Constitutional Court partly remedied this 
ambiguity by clarifying that the concept of “Republican form” had to be interpreted in 
a broad manner so as to include the supreme principles codified in the first part of the 
Constitution:
The Italian Constitution contains some supreme principles that cannot be subverted or 
modified in their essential content, either by laws amending the Constitution, or by other 
constitutional laws. These include both principles that are expressly considered absolute 
limits on the power to amend the Constitution, such as the republican form of State (Art. 
139) as well as those principles that even though not expressly mentioned among those 
principles not subject to the procedure of constitutional amendment, belong to the es-
sence of the supreme values upon which the Italian Constitution is founded. This Court, 
furthermore, has already recognized in numerous decisions how the supreme principles 
of the constitutional order prevail over other laws or constitutional norms, such as when 
the Court maintained that even the prescriptions of the Concordat, which enjoy particu-
lar “constitutional protection” under Art. 7, paragraph 2, are not excluded from scrutiny 
11  CARROZZA, Paolo. Constitutionalism’s Post-modern Opening. In: LOUGHLIN, Martin; WALKER, Neil (Coord.). 
The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007.p. 169-187. p. 182.
12  FARAGUNA, Pietro. Unamendability and Constitutional Identity in the Italian Constitutional Experience. 
European Journal of Law Reform, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 329-344. Jul/Sep 2019. p. 333.
Securing “Functional” Legal Eternity in Italy
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 2, p. 321-346, maio/ago. 2021. 327
for conformity to the “supreme principles of the constitutional order” (see Judgments 
30/1971, 12/1972, 175/1973, 1/1977, 18/1982), and also when the Court affirmed that 
the laws executing the EEC Treaty may be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court “in ref-
erence to the fundamental principles of our constitutional order, and to the inalienable 
rights of the human person” (see Judgments 183/1973, 179/1984).13
This judgment represented a turning point, developing the potential implicit in 
Article 139 and paving the way for a new approach to the “Republic” clause. It confir-
med the need for a systematic interpretation of the constitutional principles. 
3. THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS AND THEIR “PROCEDURES” IN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN POST-TOTALITARIAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM
A few years after the beginning of the current Italian constitutional system, a 
major study on legislative procedure commenced in the following manner: “The jurid-
ical phenomenon of the legislative procedure, the fact of law which subjects the very 
moment of its formation to the constraint of its own rules, seems almost utopia […]. 
And yet the right of our new order, which, based on a rigid constitution […] intends to 
implement the postulates of the rule of law in every moment of the state action, has 
such a confidence in its possibilities and in its means that this is precisely this – almost 
magical – goal that it aspires to achieve”.14
This idea obviously aligns with the thought that the “volonté du peuple”, or the 
“people’s will”, is justified not only because it is the “will” of the majority, but also be-
cause it fits into forms that guarantee the most reasonable and fair expression of this 
“will”.15
Although it is indisputable that the (democratic) legislative procedure is, as a 
whole, governed by the majority rule, it is evident that it is preferable to other modes 
of normative production only to the extent that it maintains and protects its main char-
acteristics, by ensuring the effective possibility of participation for all parliamentarians 
and guaranteeing a high rate of transparency in discussions.16
However, in the context of an analysis of the Italian experience, it has recent-
ly been pointed out that, “as Walter Bagehot […] taught long ago, the centrality of 
13  Corte costituzionale, Judgment 29 December 1988, No. 1146. Translation quoted by P. FARAGUNA, Pietro. 
Unamendability and Constitutional Identity in the Italian Constitutional Experience. European Journal of Law 
Reform, vol. 21, n. 3,p. 329-344, Jul/Sep 2019. p. 336, note n. 6.
14  GALEOTTI, Serio. Contributo alla teoria del procedimento legislativo. Milano: Giuffrè, 1957. p. 1.
15  MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH, Boris. Les nouvelles tendances du droit constitutionnel. Paris: Marcel Giard, 
1931.
16  LUPO, Nicola. “Populismo legislativo?”: continuità e discontinuità nelle tendenze della legislazione italiana. 
Ragionpratica, vol. 27, n. 1, p. 251-271, Jan/Mar 2019. p. 265.
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parliament has, with the exception of the finance law, little to do with lawmaking. The 
power of parliament manifests itself in the formation (and in the transformation, termi-
nation and reconstruction) of the government; in the provision of space for the opposi-
tion; in negotiations aimed at reconciling the interests and preferences of parliamentar-
ians and their parties representing the majority and the opposition(s)”.17
Populism, by definition, stands against everything that appears to make public 
decisions less “easy”, thus making the law-making process one of its natural targets.18In 
fact, the essence of the legislative procedure is not to make decisions instant but to 
subject them to a series of intermediate steps. Hence, a populist movement clashes 
with this process once it enters parliament.However, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween two scenarios, and Italy has given interesting examples of both: when a populist 
movement is in opposition and when it is in the majority.19.
It is known that the debate on procedural guarantees in public law continued 
through a good part of the twentieth century. In the Italian context, it passed from a 
rather sceptical attitude towards the relevance of procedural guarantees, moving on 
to the progressive (but still contrasted) recognition of its centrality entre-deux-guerres20 
and then to the unanimous recognition of theirimportance.21 Related to this is its instru-
mentality with respect to the “step forward” of the constitutional state in its most mod-
ern version, which is aimed at the effective and democratic involvement of all citizens 
in the management of public affairs,22, with a vis expansivathat was likely to encompass 
even political and legislative decisions, with very few exceptions, thus making it a task of 
unprecedented difficulty in societies that are extremely complex in terms of interests.23
17  PASQUINO, Gianfranco. The state of the Italian Republic. Contemporary Italian Politics, vol. 11, n. 2, 
p. 195-204, Apr/Jun 2019. p. 195.
18  We use the expression “law-making process” in order to encompass a broader meaning as compared to 
“legislative procedure” (see PIZZORUSSO, Alessandro. The Law-Making Process as a Juridical and Political Activ-
ity. In: PIZZORUSSO, Alessandro (Coord.). Law in the Making. A Comparative Survey. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1988. p. 1-87; ZANDER, Michael. The Law-Making Process. London: Bloomsbury, 2015), including in particular, 
as far as it is relevant here, the initiative phase which takes place within the government.
19  BRESSANELLI, Edoardo; NATALI, David. Introduction. Contemporary Italian Politics, vol. 11, n. 3, p. 208-
219, Jul/Sep 2019.
20  SANDULLI, Aldo M. Il procedimento amministrativo. Milano: Giuffrè, 1940.
21  BENVENUTI, Feliciano. Funzione amministrativa, procedimento, processo. Rivista trimestrale di diritto 
pubblico, vol. 2, n. 1, p. 118-145, Jan/Mar 1952.
22  GIANNINI, Massimo Severo. Diritto amministrativo. Milano: Giuffrè, 1970; seeCHITI, Edoardo. La dimensio-
ne funzionale del procedimento. In: FIORENTINO, Luigi et al. Le amministrazioni pubbliche tra conservazio-
ne e riforme. Omaggio degli allievi a Sabino Cassese. Milano: Giuffrè, 2008, p. 211-240.
23  This is obviously something that did not concern Italy alone. See, for example MASHAW, Jerry L. Explaining 
Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development. The Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, vol. 6, special issue, p. 267-298, jan. 1990 and MASHAW, Jerry L. Due Process 
in the Administrative State. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985. Furthermore, it is well known that 
Niklas Luhmann, from a sociological point of view, stressed “legitimization through process” (see LUHMANN, 
Niklas. Legitimation durch Verfahren. Frankfurt: Surhkamp, 1983).
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Within the context of a tough reductio ad unum of the formal and substantive as-
pects of a regime that can be defined as “democratic”, Carlo Lavagna essentially identi-
fied “the problem of democracy [...] right here: in the choice of the most suitable means 
to legally regulate […] the supreme activities of the State, preparing not their general 
content but rather the ways to exercise them”. Their aim is to facilitate or even impose a 
compromise, given the “impossibility of achieving satisfactory and effective substantial 
norms of political and legislative activities”,24 or to reduce democracy to mere majority 
rule. 
This kind of transition is clearly evident on a smaller scale in parliamentary law, 
which has passed from being the expression of a single social class to being the arena 
for a pluralism that has powerfully entered the constitutional mechanisms. The com-
promise is notoriously crucial in Weber’s analysis of politics,25 and the work of Kelsen 
himself is marked by his “enthusiastic defense of compromise”, a conception forged “in 
the specific discursive context of the German interwar period, during which this notion 
acquired a strongly depreciative connotation, mainly by authors such as Carl Schmitt 
and Rudolf Smend”, at a time when, not by chance, “the strongest critics of compromis-
es or coalitions sometimes emerged from the same source that denounced the delete-
rious effects of parliamentarism and political parties”.26
Essentially, each law, understood here as a parliamentary law, is approved fol-
lowing a legislative procedure, which creates a balance between social pluralism and 
the unity of the legal system. Today, the formula of law as an expression of the general 
will is no longer useful in terms of content, but remains fundamental on a procedural 
level if there is a functioning legislative procedure that allows the active participation 
of the generality of political subjects.27
4. ELECTORAL LEGISLATION AS A PART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER: THE INVOLVEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ELECTORAL LAW
The growing involvement of constitutional courts in electoral law might be 
described as being part of a wider trend towards the judicialization of politics.28. This 
24  LAVAGNA, Carlo. Considerazioni sui caratteri degli ordinamenti democratici. Rivista trimestrale di diritto 
pubblico, vol. 6, n. 2, p. 392-422, Apr/Jun 1956. p. 392 ff.
25  WEBER, Max. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: Mohr, 1921-22.
26  BAUME, Sandrine. What Place Should Compromise Be Given in Democracy? A Reflection on Hans Kelsen’s 
Contribution. Négociations, vol. 27, p. 73-89, Jan/Jun 2017. p. 74.
27  LUPO, Nicola. “Populismo legislativo?”: continuità e discontinuità nelle tendenze della legislazione italiana. 
Ragionpratica, vol. 27, n. 1, p. 251-271, Jan/Mar 2019. p. 253.
28  In this respect, see, among othersFEREJOHN, John. Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law. .Law and Con-
temporary Problems, vol. 65, n. 3, p. 41-68, Jul/Sep 2002; HIRSCHL, Ran. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins 
and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004; HIRSCHL, 
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term emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century and hints at “the ever-acce-
lerating reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, 
public policy questions and political controversies”.29. More specifically, the courts have 
become increasingly involved in conflicts whose solution used to be seen as reser-
ved for constitutional conventions and gentlemen’s agreements among the political 
branches.30.
Against this backdrop, electoral laws have proved to be no exception. This is true 
of both well-established democracies and countries that have recently departed from 
authoritarian regimes and embraced liberal constitutionalism. Pildes has stated that:
Over the last generation, we have witnessed … ‘the constitutionalization of democratic 
politics’. … Court decisions now routinely engage certain expressive aspects of democra-
cy and elections … In addressing various constitutional challenges to the way legislative 
rules structure democratic participation and elections, courts struggle to reconcile pro-
tection of essential democratic rights; the need to permit popular experimentation with 
the forms of democracy; the risk of political insiders manipulating the ground rules of 
democracy for self-interested reasons; and the need to protect democracy against an-
ti-democratic efforts that arise through the political process itself.31
The Italian Constitution of 1947 was drafted in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II and, unlike the German Basic Law of 1949, is an example of the weak ra-
tionalization of parliamentary government32. The Italian Constitutional Court and its 
(West) German counterpart are among the oldest constitutional courts in continental 
Europe, and the establishment of the Italian court can be described as a typical reaction 
to a totalitarian past.
Some preliminary definitions are needed before we address the major issues 
underlying the judicial review of electoral laws. These concern the various possible 
Ran. The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts.Annual Review of Political Science, 
vol. 11, p. 93-118, Jan/Dec 2008; CASSESE, Sabino. The Will of the People and the Command of the Law: Consti-
tutional Courts, Democracy and Justice.In: BARSOTTI, Vittoria; VARANO, Vincenzo (Coord.). Il nuovo ruolo delle 
Corti supreme nell’ordine politico e istituzionale. Dialogo di diritto comparato. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche 
Italiane, 2012, p. 17-33.
29  HIRSCHL, Ran. The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide. Fordham Law 
Review, vol. 75, n. 2, p. 721-753, Oct/Nov 2006.
30  As noted by SPERTI, Angioletta. Corti supreme e conflitti tra poteri. Spunti per un confronto Italia-Usa 
sugli strumenti e le tecniche di giudizio del giudice costituzionale. Torino: Giappichelli, 2005. p. 83.
31  PILDES, Richard H. Elections. In: ROSENFELD, Michel; SAJÓ, András (Coord.). The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 529-544. p. 529.
32  See MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH, Boris. Les nouvelles tendances du droit constitutionnel. Paris: Marcel Giard, 
1931. p. 23; RUBECHI, Massimo. La forma di governo dell’Italia Repubblicana. Genesi, caratteristiche e profili 
evolutivi di un nodo mai risolto. In: CORTESE, Fulvio; CARUSO, Corrado; ROSSI, Stefano (Coord.). Immaginare la 
Repubblica. Mito e attualità dell’Assemblea Costituente. Milano: Franco Angeli, 2018. p. 175-209. p. 181 ff.
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notions of electoral law, the relationship between constitutional provisions and (ordi-
nary) electoral laws, and the position of electoral laws within the constitutional order.
First and foremost, what is meant by (national) electoral laws for the purposes 
of this essay? It might be argued that electoral laws are complex norms, as they regu-
late a number of distinct, although closely intertwined, issues – they might fittingly be 
described as systems of concentric circles. At the heart of electoral law lies the electoral 
system or voting system that provides rules for turning votes into seats and might also 
include prescriptions for the boundaries of constituencies. A “second circle” is made 
up of rules concerning who is entitled to vote or to be elected. Finally, a third, exter-
nal circle encompasses other norms, whose ultimate goal is to ensure that electoral 
fairness is respected; these deal, for example, with voting procedures, the oversight of 
elections, the regulation of electoral communications and opinion polling, campaign 
financing, the reimbursement of election expenses, and so on.33 For the purposes of 
this essay, only the legislative and supra-legislative regulation of the voting system will 
be considered.
The relationship between the relevant constitutional provisions and electoral 
legislation can only be properly understood from a dual vantage point. Electoral laws 
are generally ordinary laws, and they often enjoy a very peculiar status within the legal 
order. Italian constitutional scholarship has striven to grasp the ambiguous status of 
electoral law. It has been defined as the core of the material constitution, as it deter-
mines how the prevalent political forces are represented (and selected) and ultimately 
shape the course of state action.34 Regardless of its formal status, electoral law is closely 
connected to the fundamental principles and values of the Constitution.35 For these 
reasons, electoral law lends itself to being described as part of the constitutional order, 
whose core is the Constitution, as it strongly affects the functioning of representative 
government and the exercise of voting rights.36. What clearly emerges is that electoral 
legislation might influence the way in which some of the provisions of the Constitution 
are applied. 
On the other hand, constitutions do not necessarily contain detailed prescrip-
tions on electoral law.37 The constitutionalization of the electoral system was quite a 
33  SeeLANCHESTER, Fulco. Il sistema elettorale in senso stretto dal “Porcellum” all’“Italicum”. Democrazia e 
diritto, vol. 52, n. 1, p. 15-29, Jan/Mar 2015.
34  SeeFROSINI, Tommaso Edoardo. Sistemi elettorali e sistemi di partito. In: CARROZZA, Paolo; DI GIOVINE, Al-
fonso; FERRARI, Giuseppe Franco (Coord.). Diritto costituzionale comparato. 2. ed. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2014. 
p. 877-892.p. 879.
35  SeeLANCHESTER, Fulco. Il sistema elettorale in senso stretto dal “Porcellum” all’“Italicum”. Democrazia e 
diritto, vol. 52, n. 1, p. 15-29, Jan/Mar 2015.note 34.
36  See BARBERA, Augusto. Costituzione della Repubblica italiana. In: AA.VV., Enciclopedia del diritto. Annali, 
Vol. VIII. Milano: Giuffrè, 2015, p. 263-358. p. 277 ff.
37  See detailed overview by GIGLIOTTI, Alessandro. Sui principi costituzionali in materia elettorale. Rivista 
AIC, vol. 5, n. 4, p. 1-25, Oct/Dec 2014; SEUROT, Laurent. Faut-il constitutionnaliser le mode de scrutin aux 
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frequent option in the aftermath of World War I, at a time when proportional represen-
tation was seen as an inevitable consequence of the rise of democratic government 
and mass political parties.38 The overall picture has become more complex since 1945. 
The four largest Member States in the European Union have no constitutionally en-
trenched electoral system. Because of the alleged failure of parliamentary regimes 
based on proportional representation in France (Fourth Republic), Germany (Weimar 
Republic) and Italy (shortly before the March on Rome), in those constitutional orders 
no specific voting system has been constitutionally entrenched, and the legislature en-
joys some degree of discretion and flexibility in the electoral domain. Still, 16 out of 
the 28 Member States of the European Union have some form of constitutionalization 
of the electoral system. The relevant provisions may be extremely vague39 or quite de-
tailed40; in Portugal, they are even unamendable.41 However, constitutional provisions 
concerning the guarantee of voting rights, most notably the right to an equal vote, or 
mandating equal opportunities for political parties, provide constitutional courts with 
another major standard for reviewing electoral laws. This is all the more relevant in juris-
dictions in which no specific voting system has been formally entrenched.
Leaving aside substantive issues, the circumstances under which an electoral 
law is passed have also become increasingly important. The Code of Good Practice in 
Electoral Matters, adopted in October 2002 by the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe,42 focuses not only on the “underlying principles of Europe’s electoral heritage” 
(e.g. universal, equal, free and secret suffrage) but also on the conditions for implement-
ing these principles. For the purposes of this paper, it is important to underline that:
a. Apart from technical and detail rules – which may be included in regulations of the 
executive – rules of electoral law must have at least the rank of a statute. 
b. The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, 
membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, 
should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be 
written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law.43
élections législatives? Revue française de droit constitutionnel, vol. 26, n. 3, p. 657-678, Jul/Sep 2015. p. 669 
ff.
38  See CARROZZA, Paolo. È solo una questione di numeri? Le proposte di riforma degli artt. 56 e 57 Cost. per la 
riduzione dei parlamentari. Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, vol. 21, special issue, p. 81-100, 2019. 
p. 93 f.
39  See e.g. Art. 68(3) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978: “The election in each constituency shall be conduct-
ed on the basis of proportional representation”.
40  See Arts. 16(4) and 18(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland of 1937, providing a detailed regula-
tion on the single transferable vote.
41  See Art. 288 of the Constitution of 1976.
42  Available at www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2002)139-e.
43  Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Guidelines on Elections, § II.2 (emphases added).
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More recently, the Venice Commission has made it clear that:
It is important that methods of allocation of seats and any other fundamental elements 
of the electoral legislation are determined by a broad political consensus. A broad public 
consultation and acceptance of the election legislation encourages public trust and con-
fidence in the electoral process.44
Regarding the relevant constitutional provisions, it should be noted that the 
Italian Constitution of 1947 does not provide for the adoption of a specific electoral 
system. Therefore, the Constitutional Court has to rely on other constitutional provi-
sions when reviewing electoral laws. The most important provisions concern the funda-
mental right to an equal vote and, possibly, the need for the intrinsic rationality of the 
legislative provisions at stake. 
Starting with the main relevant provisions in the Italian Constitution, Article 
48(2) defines voting rights in a typical way –vote is “personal and equal, free and se-
cret. The exercise thereof is a civic duty”. On the other hand, no constitutional provi-
sion explicitly entrenches any specific electoral system, and debates at the Constitu-
ent Assembly show that some of the constituent fathers were in favour of entrenching 
proportional representation, at least with regard to elections to the lower house. The 
text that was passed by the Assembly does not mention any specific voting system.45 
However, a number of counterarguments have been deployed in order to decipher the 
meaning of constitutional silence46 in this area. The first counterargument has to do 
with the origin of the Constitution: the key role of the political parties participating in 
the National Liberation Committee during the critical years from the downfall of the 
Fascist regime through the advent of the Republic is implicitly recognized in the text 
of the Constitution: therefore, proportional representation seemed to be best placed 
to guarantee the individual positions of the parties that founded the Republic47. Some 
years later, an influential constitutional law scholar, Carlo Lavagna, has argued that a 
clear preference for proportional representation could be read into the Constitution 
itself.48 The starting point of his claim is that the Constitution clearly protects linguistic, 
44  Venice Commission, Opinion no. 662/2012 on the Act on the Elections of Members of Parliament of Hun-
gary, § 31.
45  SeeTRUCCO, Lara. Democrazie elettorali e Stato costituzionale. Torino: Giappichelli, 2011. p. 513 f.
46  See general remarks by FOLEY, Michael. The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps, ‘abeyances’ and political tem-
perament in the maintenance of government. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.
47  See CRISAFULLI, Vezio. I partiti nella Costituzione. In: Studi per il ventesimo anniversario dell’Assemblea 
costituente, vol. 2, Le libertà civili e politiche. Firenze: Vallecchi, 1969, p. 105-143. p. 108 f.; BETTINELLI, Ernesto. 
All’origine della democrazia dei paritit. La formazione del nuovo ordinamento elettorale nel periodo costi-
tuente (1944-1948). Milano: Edizioni di Comunità, 1982. p. 269.
48  See LAVAGNA, Carlo. Il sistema elettorale nella Costituzione italiana. Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubbli-
co, vol. 2, n. 4, p. 849-875, Oct/Dec 1952. p. 558 ff.
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religious and political minorities. Moreover, some provisions that are still in force re-
quire a parliamentary majority vote and even a two-thirds vote: this is the case, for ex-
ample, for the election of the President of the Republic and the judges of the Consti-
tutional Court, and the approval of constitutional amendments. All these norms take 
for granted “the necessity for minorities to be represented in Parliament”.49 Against this 
basic framework, proportional representation seems to be a self-evident consequence 
of some of the basic assumptions underlying the Italian constitutional arrangements of 
1947. Lavagna’s theses have not been generally accepted either by scholars or by the 
case law of the Constitutional Court. They are, however, very much respected, as they 
provide a comprehensive reading of the provisions of the Constitution.50 Finally, anoth-
er influential scholar, Gianni Ferrara, also argued that the implicitly constitutional status 
of proportional representation in the Italian Republic is the result of a joint reading of 
the fundamental principle of equality and the constitutional recognition of the role of 
political parties.51
Thus, the principle of equal suffrage provides the main constitutional parameter 
for the judicial review of electoral laws. Leaving aside the general prohibition on plu-
ral or weighted voting, this principle lends itself to both moderate and strict readings. 
Strict readings, for instance, have become more influential in the case law of the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). A moderate reading of equal suffrage merely 
demands that the “one person, one vote” principle is respected; the German FCC refers 
to this as Zählwertgleichheit. However, if the principle of equal suffrage is to be fully 
respected, electoral law should also be required to ensure that each vote is equally 
efficient, that is, that there is equal opportunity for success at the polls, or Erfolgswert-
gleichheit, according to the FCC.
In Italy, a moderate reading of the principle of equal suffrage clearly prevailed 
until the Constitutional Court rendered Judgment 1/2014. Carlo Lavagna argues that 
the implicit constitutional entrenchment of proportional representation requires Ar-
ticle 48 of the Constitution and the principle of equal votes to be construed to ensure 
that there is not only formal equality of voters but also substantial equality, thereby 
confirming the quasi-constitutional status of proportional representation.52
49  See LAVAGNA, Carlo. Il sistema elettorale nella Costituzione italiana. Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubbli-
co, vol. 2, n. 4, p. 849-875, Oct/Dec 1952. p. 866,note 49.
50  See CROCE, Marco. Appunti in tema di Costituzione italiana e sistemi elettorali (rileggendo Carlo Lavagna). 
Rivista AIC, vol. 2, n. 1, p. 1-10, Jan/Mar 2011, www.rivistaaic.it/appunti-in-tema-di-costituzione-italiana-e-si-
stemi-elettorali-rileggendo-carlo-lavagna.html.
51  See FERRARA, Gianni. Il governo di coalizione. Milano: Giuffrè, 1973. p. 50.
52  See LAVAGNA, Carlo. Il sistema elettorale nella Costituzione italiana. Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubbli-
co, vol. 2, n. 4, p. 849-875, Oct/Dec 1952. p. 871, note 49.
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However, constitutional courts are becoming involved with reviewing electoral 
lawsmore often.53 This is more striking in western European democracies, in which con-
flicts concerning electoral laws had traditionally arisen only in relation to agreements 
among the political actors. Consequently, the legislature was assumed to enjoy a wide 
discretion within the framework of the constitution.54 On the whole, this trend might 
be seen as a signal of a growing lack of connection between the political elites and the 
public, and also between established political parties and emerging parties and move-
ments. Political elites might have been perceived to have exploited their established 
institutional position in order to shape the contents of the electoral law to their own 
advantage, thereby ensuring self-perpetuation. The jurisdiction in which an activist at-
titude of the constitutional court is most clearly recognizable is undoubtedly that of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The FCC has developed a strict reading of the principle of 
equal suffrage and a generous interpretation of the voting rights protected by Article 
38 of the Basic Law, treating it as a constitutional clause justifying the admissibility of 
constitutional complaints in this area.55
Italy’s political institutions during the period from 1948 to the beginning of the 
1990s “have often been considered rather inefficient: this is because they were char-
acterized by heterogeneous coalitions racked by internal strife, unstable cabinets, a 
cumbersome legislative process and a mass of legislation, consisting mainly of small-
scale measures incapable of generating any incisive process of reform even when the 
country was up against an alarming level of growth in public debt, as was the case in 
the 1980s”, and featured “a multiplicity of party-political and institutional veto players, 
variously distributed across both the centre and the outer fringes of the political are-
na, both in government and in parliament”. Nevertheless, one of the consequences of 
such a consensual system was the so-called “centrality of parliament”, “the place where 
governing parties conducted continuous negotiations, and where, in the 1970s in par-
ticular, attempts were made to include the PCI [i.e. the Italian Communist Party] in the 
decision-making process”.56
Since the 1980s this style of government progressively lost legitimacy, with pro-
found changes being made at the end of the Cold War and after a huge bribery scandal. 
53  See e.g. D’ALOIA, Antonio. Dai voti ai seggi. Limiti costituzionali alla distorsione della rappresentanza elet-
torale. Rassegna parlamentare, vol. 56, n. 4, p. 813-842, Oct/Dec 2014; DELLEDONNE, Giacomo. Corti costi-
tuzionali e legislazione elettorale: una comparazione italo-tedesca. Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 
vol. 64, n. 4, p. 1031-1062, Oct/Dec 2014.
54  See PINELLI, Cesare. Eguaglianza del voto e ripartizione dei seggi tra circoscrizioni. Giurisprudenza costi-
tuzionale, vol. 55, n. 4, p. 3322-3326, Jul/Aug2010..
55  See ROMANO, Andrea. Accesso alla giustizia costituzionale ed eguaglianza del voto. Legittimazione delle 
Corti e discrezionalità legislativa. Diritto pubblico, vol. 21, n. 2, p. 431-508, May/Aug 2015. p. 431.
56  VASSALLO, Salvatore. Government under Berlusconi: The functioning of the core institutions in Italy. West 
European Politics, vol. 30, n. 4, p. 692-710, Sep/Oct 2007. p. 692
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The party system, along with the electoral system, was completely changed, shifting to 
a majority system. Everything began revolving around the polarizing presence of Silvio 
Berlusconi.
The establishment of a bipolar political system “saw the demise of a number of 
practices adopted during the First Republic, […]. Each coalition has also been headed 
by a leader who is that coalition’s chosen candidate for the premiership. Thus, elections 
have become decisive, and as a consequence certain features that are characteristic of 
majoritarian democracies have emerged both within parliament and in the workings 
of the cabinet. […] Briefly speaking, the Prime Minister’s position within the cabinet 
has been strengthened, an adversarial dynamic has emerged within parliament, and 
government has acquired greater agenda-setting powers”.57
This shift generated “a profound transformation in Italy’s main socio-political 
structures, as well as in public communication and debates”, so that “more than twenty 
years after that historical phase, it is safe to say that Italian society and politics have 
taken a markedly populist direction, to the point where Italy today is perhaps the only 
country in the world where several populist forces compete with each other and where 
a widespread political communication characterized by populist tones and styles 
prevails”.58
In Italy, it seemed difficult, at least initially, to challenge the national electoral 
law in the Constitutional Court.59 The main reason for this is that, under Article 66 of the 
Constitution, the two houses of parliament are in charge of verifying the credentials 
of their members. It is therefore practically impossible to lodge a complaint with an 
ordinary or administrative court concerning the application of the national electoral 
law. In principle, proceedings before the Constitutional Court cannot be initiated by 
parliamentary minorities or other political office-holders. Constitutional complaints are 
not admitted. Regions can only challenge a state law before the Court insofar as it im-
pinges upon their own competencies.60 In the light of this, it seemed very difficult to 
conceive of a constitutional review of electoral laws before the Court rendered its land-
mark judgment (Judgment1/2014). It should be noted, however, that the Renzi–Boschi 
constitutional amendment – which was eventually rejected in a popular referendum 
on 4 December 2016 – tried to address this issue. If the constitutional amendment had 
57  VASSALLO, Salvatore. Government under Berlusconi: The functioning of the core institutions in Italy. West-
European Politics, vol. 30, n. 4, p. 692-710, Sep/Oct 2007. p. 692.
58  ANSELMI, Manuel. Populism. An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2018. p. 66.
59  Italian electoral laws regulating the election of regional legislative assemblies and of the European Parlia-
ment lie outside the scope of this essay.
60  See BARSOTTI, Vittoria; CAROZZA, Paolo G.; CARTABIA, Marta; SIMONCINI, Andrea. Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. p. 52 ff.
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come into force, the revised text of Articles 73 and 134 of the Constitution would have 
empowered parliamentary minorities (at least a quarter of the members of the lower 
house or one third of the members of the Senate) to initiate an a priori review of nation-
al electoral laws by the Constitutional Court.61 These procedural difficulties were dis-
cussed in depth by scholars, with some suggesting that the Court should avail itself of 
preventive judgments on the admissibility of referendum initiatives in order to review 
national electoral laws on its own initiative.62
Access to constitutional justice is not the only major difference between the 
German and the Italian constitutional courts in this area. The effects of judicial decisions 
that strike down legislative provisions and the possibility of the publication of dissent-
ing opinions should also be mentioned.
Italian constitutional provisions are quite rigid as regards the effects, most nota-
bly the temporal effects, of decisions rendered by the Constitutional Court. According 
to Article 136(1) of the Constitution, “[w]hen the Court declares the constitutional ille-
gitimacy of a law or enactment having the force of law, the law ceases to have effect 
the day following the publication of the decision”. In some cases, the Court has tried to 
address this problem by making its judgments come into effect gradually,63 and this 
might be particularly urgent with regard to national electoral laws, which the Court has 
consistently described as constitutionally mandated laws (leggicostituzionalmente nec-
essarie).64 Under this doctrine of the Court, the electoral law is constitutionally mandat-
ed because it is needed for the correct working of the legislature. For this reason, there 
should always be a fully-fledged, immediately applicable electoral law; this doctrine, 
which was developed with regard to referendum initiatives, has a considerable effect 
on the review performed by the Court when an electoral law is at stake.65
61  See ROSSI, Emanuele. Una Costituzione migliore? Contenuti e limiti della riforma costituzionale. Pisa: 
Pisa University Press, 2016. p. 127 ff.; DAL CANTO, Francesco. Corte costituzionale e giudizio preventivo sulle 
leggi elettorali. Quaderni costituzionali, vol. 36, n. 1, p. 39-60, Jan/Mar 2016. p. 671.
62  See CROCE, Marco. “Se non ora quando?”: sui possibili vizi di costituzionalità della legge elettorale (e sui 
possibili modi per farli valere). Forum di Quaderni costituzionali, 9 December 2007, www.forumcostituziona-
le.it.
63  See BARSOTTI, Vittoria; CAROZZA, Paolo G.; CARTABIA, Marta; SIMONCINI, Andrea. Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. p. 87 ff.
64  Corte costituzionale, Judgment no. 26/1997.
65  As noted by BARSOTTI, Vittoria; CAROZZA, Paolo G.; CARTABIA, Marta; SIMONCINI, Andrea. Italian Consti-
tutional Justice in Global Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. p.51. More recently, see Judgment 
10/2020, in which the Constitutional Court declared to be inadmissible the proposed referendum question on 
the “Abolition of the proportional method of allocation of seats in multi-member constituencies, in the elector-
al system currently in force for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic” (the request had been 
submitted by eight Regional Councils with a centre-right majority).
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5. FREE MANDATE FOR MPS
Having clarified the quasi-constitutional dimension of electoral legislation in 
Italy, it is time to move on to the free mandate of MPs, which has recently been under 
siege. The particular understanding of democracy advanced by the Five Star Movement 
is at odds with many fundamental principles of the Italian Constitution, such as the 
principle of the free mandate for parliamentarians. The prohibition of the imperative 
mandate has been defined as a “‘cornerstone of European democratic constitutiona-
lism” by the Venice Commission.66 The debate surrounding the prohibition of the im-
perative mandate (expressly established by, among others, Art. 67 of the Italian Cons-
titution,67 Art. 38(1) of the German Basic Law68and Art. 27 of the French Constitution69) 
is directly linked to another feature of populism, namely the idea that representatives 
must respond immediately to the demands of the people, having almost no autonomy 
in performing their public function, as if they were bound by a specific contract. This 
risks reducing representation to a private law scheme, and this narrative is confirmed 
in the idea of the “contract for government”70 signed between the Five Star Movement 
and the League. The idea of a contract is not entirely new, since Berlusconi also presen-
ted and signed the famous “contract with the Italians” during a very famous talk show 
(Porta a Porta) on 8 May 2001. This demonstrates that these forms of populism did not 
emerge completely out of the blue. In addition, the very idea of a “contract”– according 
to the populist rhetoric of the Five Star Movement – implies that there is a need to over-
come the prohibition of the imperative mandate or at least to mitigate it by insisting on 
party discipline or pecuniary sanctions.71
66  The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Report on the Imperative 
Mandate and Similar Practices’ (2009) http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdf-
file=CDL-AD(2009)027-e.
67  Art. 67 of the Italian Constitution: ‘Each Member of Parliament represents the Nation and carries out his 
duties without a binding mandate’.
68  Art. 38(1) of the German Basic Law: ‘Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, 
free, equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or 
instructions and responsible only to their conscience’. Among the possible violations of the principle of the 
free mandate, German constitutional law scholarship mentions blank resignation letters, penalties for leaving 
a parliamentary group without resigning, the practice of inactive mandate (ruhendesMandat), and rotation 
of elective offices (MAGIERA, Siegfried. Artikel 38. In: SACHS, Michael (Coord.). Grundgesetz-Kommentar. 
5. ed. München: C.H. Beck, 2009. p. 1177-1205. p. 1189; see also KLEIN, Hans Hugo. Status des Abgeordneten. 
In: ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Coord.). Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
vol. III, Demokratie – Bundesorgane. 3. ed. Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2005. p. 741-768. p. 742 ff.).
69  Art. 27 of the French Constitution: ‘No Member shall be elected with any binding mandate. Members’ right 
to vote shall be exercised in person. An Institutional Act may, in exceptional cases, authorize voting by proxy. 
In that event, no Member shall be given more than one proxy’.
70  For a recent work on this concept see: DI MARZIO, Fabrizio. La politica e il contratto. Dalla affermazione 
dei valori alla negoziazione degli interessi. Roma: Donzelli, 2018.
71  GRASSO, Giorgio. Mandato imperativo e mandato di partito: il caso del MoVimento 5 Stelle. Osservatorio 
AIC, vol. 5, n. 2, p. 1-7, May/Aug 2017, https://www.osservatorioaic.it/it/osservatorio/ultimi-contributi-pubbli-
cati/giorgio-grasso/mandato-imperativo-e-mandato-di-partito-il-caso-del-movimento-5-stelle. 
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These phenomena respond to the idea of democracy endorsed by Davide Ca-
saleggio in a recent speech given at a workshop organized by the United Nations72 
and in an article published in Corriere della Sera.73 Without giving a detailed analysis of 
his thoughts, it is sufficient to underline his strong support for direct democracy and 
his frontal attack on the actors in traditional politics, namely political parties and par-
liamentary arenas. On this basis, the former minister Riccardo Fraccaro74 denounced 
classic representative democracy as inadequate, and stressed the need for more direct 
democracy, especially with the advent of new technologies. Davide Casaleggio recently 
said that “the overcoming of representative democracy is inevitable”.75 These are vital 
considerations that deserve attention and should not necessarily be seen as populist 
ideas, but one can nevertheless express concern, especially as regards the maximum 
dose of direct democracy that a system of representative democracy can tolerate.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This analysis has shown that controversies about parliamentary procedures, 
electoral legislation and the free mandate for MPs are currently among the crucial chal-
lenges for constitutional law. Complex constitutional principles are at stake, most nota-
bly the principles of equality and representation, but also that of the efficient operation 
of the parliamentary regime. At the same time, constitutional courts face massive pres-
sure from both the public and the political elites. The political debate that preceded Ju-
dgment no. 35/2017 of the Italian Constitutional Court provides a convincing example 
of this. Following the constitutional referendum on 4 December 2016, the electoral sys-
tem looked doomed because of the case pending before the Court and also for political 
reasons. In fact, after the apparent failure of Matteo Renzi’s reform attempts, even “his” 
electoral law seemed to have lost political support. In the end, however, the political 
elites decided not to change it, and they waited instead for the judgment of the Court 
as if they were listening to an oracle. The frequent involvement of the constitutional 
courts in this area of the constitutional order may well mean that we are “mov[ing] 




74  BERTINI, Carlo. Riccardo Fraccaro: “Meno onorevoli e più referendum. In cinque leggi il piano di riforme”. 
La Stampa, 11 September 2018, www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2018/09/11/news/riccardo-fracca-
ro-meno-onorevoli-e-piu-referendum-in-cinque-leggi-il-piano-di-riforme-1.34044271.
75  CASALEGGIO, Davide. Casaleggio: i 7 paradossi della democrazia, a sbagliare non è mai chi vota. Corriere 
della Sera, 17 September 2019, www.corriere.it/politica/19_settembre_17/06-politico-t7ccorriere-web-sezio-
ni-29ff88c4-d8bb-11e9-a64f-042100a6f996.shtml.
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closer to the global constitutional ideal that ‘everything is justiciable’”.76 This also points 
to the weakness of the representative political elites, who appear disconnected from 
the general public.77 The increasing volatility of electoral laws is a direct consequence of 
the increasing volatility of voting behaviours, the intrinsic frailness of present-day party 
systems and the clear trend towards a further fragmentation of society.
The formidable challenge that constitutional courts are facing is to bear this 
factual background in mind and to treat electoral law as a (non-detached) part of the 
constitutional order. Electoral law should thus be interpreted and reviewed in the light 
of all the relevant constitutional principles. 
At the same time, we have focused on how the fierce disputes on parliamentary 
procedures and the freedom of the mandate given to MPs clearly highlight – in Italy as 
in other European states – the pressures to which the pillars of modern and contempo-
rary constitutionalism are subject.
What can be expected in the future? Solutions “will certainly not come from 
Italian society as long as it remains fragmented and corporatist, and marred by inter-
personal mistrust. But the weakest link is represented by the parties (most of which no 
longer even deserve this name) and by the deconstructed nature of the party system. 
Will Italy be the first political system to have a working democracy in a situation in 
which parties have practically disappeared?”.78
Obviously, this is not a desirable scenario, and it is to be hoped that the new 
phase inaugurated by the second Conte government will help Italian politics to regain 
the path of a functioning democracy.
From a broader perspective, as has been recently noted, “populist” legislator 
tends to over-emphasize the mere input legitimacy, stressing the directly elective na-
ture of parliament itself, and therefore a possible solution is to use, even for the analysis 
of individual state systems, the full potential of “throughput legitimacy”,79 “an ‘umbrella 
concept’ accompanying the other two umbrella concepts of input and output legit-
imacy, as criteria for dynamic and ‘multi-centric’ processes of policy formulation and 
implementation”.80 Throughput legitimacy is “judged in terms of the efficacy, account-
76  LONGO, Erik; PIN, Andrea. Judicial Review, Election Law, and Proportionality. Notre Dame Journal of Inter-
national and Comparative Law, vol. 6, n. 1, p. 101-118, Jan/Dec 2016. p. 102.
77  See PISANESCHI, Andrea. Giustizia costituzionale e leggi elettorali: le ragioni di un controllo difficile. Qua-
derni costituzionali, vol. 35, n. 1, p. 135-156, Jan/Mar 2015. p. 139.
78  PASQUINO, Gianfranco. The state of the Italian Republic. Contemporary Italian Politics, vol. 11, n. 2, 
p. 195-204, Apr/Jun 2019. note 17.
79  LUPO, Nicola. “Populismo legislativo?”: continuità e discontinuità nelle tendenze della legislazione italiana. 
Ragionpratica, vol. 27, n. 1, p. 251-271, Jan/Mar 2019. p. 253, note 16,
80  SCHMIDT, Vivien; WOOD, Matthew. Conceptualising Throughput Legitimacy: Procedural Mechanisms of 
Accountability, Transparency, Inclusiveness and Openness in EU Governance. Public Administration, vol. 97, 
n. 4, p. 727-740, Oct/Dec 2019. p. 737.
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ability and transparency” of governance processes, not in opposition but “along with 
their inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the people”, within “the space 
between the political input and the policy output, which has typically been left blank 
by political systems theorists”. It focuses on the quality of the governance processes “as 
contributing to a different kind of normative legitimacy from both the performance-ori-
ented legitimacy of output and the participation-oriented legitimacy of input”.81
However, an important novelty seems to move in the opposite direction as 
regards all the three topics on which this article focuses. In October 2019, the Italian 
Parliament approved a constitutional bill aimed at reducing the number of parliamen-
tarians: from the 630 current members of the “lower” House to 400, and from 315 sen-
ators to 200. The whole electorate had been called to approve this text, through the 
referendum provided for in Article 138 of the Constitution that had been requested 
by 71 senators. The referendum was scheduled for 29 March 2020 but was postponed 
because of the COVID-19 emergency.
As mentioned in a report by the parliamentary office, “following the constitu-
tional change, the average number of inhabitants for each elected member changes 
[…]. For the Chamber of Deputies, this ratio increases from 96,006 to 151,210. The 
average number of inhabitants for each senator increases, in turn, from 188,424 to 
302,420”.82 This, for arithmetical reasons, “would certainly entail a downsizing of the 
degree of representativeness of the organ. [...] More specifically, on the side of the ac-
tive electorate the ability of individual voters to influence the outcome of the election 
would decrease [...]; while on that of the passive electorate, the various candidates 
would need more consent to be elected. Which is to say that it would increase the cost 
of each seat in terms of votes”.83 Apart from this, the inevitable enlargement of the con-
stituencies could further accentuate the detachment of the representatives from their 
electorate, in a context in which the media are having an extraordinary impact, ending 
up heavily influencing the outcome of any vote.84 Furthermore, at least in the absence 
of further constitutional and electoral reforms, another problematic element appears 
in the more accentuated “distance” that would be produced “in the ratio between the 
81  SCHMIDT, Vivien. Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output, and 
‘Throughput’. Political Studies, vol. 61, n. 1, p. 2-22, Jan/Mar 2013. p. 2.
82  See http://documenti.camera.it/leg18/dossier/pdf/AC0167f.pdf 5.
83  TRUCCO, Lara. Audizione in merito al d.d.l. S. 881 su “Legge elettorale: per una determinazione dei collegi 
indipendente dal numero dei parlamentari” (Commissione Affari Costituzionali del Senato – giovedì 29 novem-
bre 2018). Consulta online, vol. 20, n. 1, p. 13-19, Jan/Apr 2019,www.giurcost.org. p. 14.
84  Ex plurimis, seeANANIA, Francesca. “In ogni epoca lo spettacolo della politica”: le elezioni alla televisione. 
In: BALLINI; Pierluigi; RIDOLFI, Maurizio (Coord.). Storia delle campagne elettorali in Italia. Milano: Bruno 
Mondadori, 2002, p. 238-260.
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number of seats allocated ex ante and the average population, especially with regard 
to certain territorial areas”. This would entail evident breaches of the principle of equal-
ity of suffrage, by over-representing or under-representing some areas with respect to 
others85: to use litotes, nothing to be optimistic about.
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